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S. HRG. 104-383

# CURRENT OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA, NORTH KOREA, HAITI, AND THE CARIBBEAN

Y 4. AR 5/3: S. HRG. 104-383

Current Operations in Bosnia, North...

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

—  
MAY 10, 1995  
—

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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# CURRENT OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA, NORTH KOREA, HAITI, AND THE CARIBBEAN

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

## SITUATIONAL UPDATE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, in closed session, at 9:31 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, McCain, Hutchison, Nunn, and Robb.

Committee staff members present: George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, John H. Miller, Thomas G. Moore, Joseph G. Pallone, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Richard E. Combs, Jr. and John W. Douglass, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen M. Paralusz and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Pamela G. Sellars, Richard F. Schwab, and David J. Gribbin, assistants to Senator Coats; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Richard W. Fieldhouse and David A. Lewis, assistants to Senator Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Lisa W. Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

Senator MCCAIN. Good morning. Senator Thurmond, in his duties as President of the Senate, is opening the Senate. In the meantime, he asked me to begin the hearing and enter into the record his opening statement.

I would like to welcome Admiral Wilson and General Estes.

Senator Robb, I had the pleasure of meeting with and spending time with General Estes in Korea not too long ago, where he did a very fine job and was able to get a good, comprehensive view of the tactical situation over there.

So we are going to see you again, General and Admiral. Please proceed in whatever fashion you feel most efficient.

Welcome.

[The opening statement of Chairman Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN STROM THURMOND

The committee meets this morning to receive an operations briefing from the Joint Staff. In particular, we want to focus on the latest developments in the former Yugoslavia and North Korea. If time permits, we will devote a few minutes to other operations where the United States is heavily involved; for example, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, and Kurdistan.

I know this briefing was arranged with very little lead time. I thank the briefers for coming, and members of the committee for cooperating on such short notice. Despite the lack of notice, I felt it was very important to get an update on the trouble spots we have been watching for some time.

The conflict in Bosnia and Croatia is heating up to the point that the U.N. forces may have to come out, under cover of NATO troops. If this happens, it will be the largest and most dangerous operation we have undertaken since the Gulf war. The Bosnian conflict and possible U.N. withdrawal are issues of such magnitude that the committee needs to take a further look at the situation. I plan to hold a hearing on Tuesday, May 23, at 2 p.m. to review the NATO withdrawal plan, and also look at lessons learned in Somalia that might benefit our forces covering a U.N. withdrawal. I hope that Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will be able to testify at that time.

In addition to increased fighting in the former Yugoslavia, the situation in North Korea is also unraveling. In short, the committee may be faced with multiple crises in the very near future—just as we depart for the Memorial Day recess and then return for committee markup. We need this update so we can begin now to consider the decisions we may soon be called upon to make. Once again, I thank the officers from the Joint Staff, and look forward to your briefing.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HOWELL M. ESTES, USAF, J-3, JOINT STAFF, AND REAR ADM. T.R. WILSON, USN, ACTING J-2, JOINT STAFF

General ESTES. Thank you, Senator.

I think what we will do is what we have done in the past on this. We will try to go through a fairly significant number of operations we are involved in to give you a feel for what the state of play is for U.S. forces.

What we plan to do, really, is to focus the update on the five major areas commanded by our CINCs, and they are shown on this particular slide.

They are the Pacific Command, Southern Command, Atlantic Command, European Command, and the Central Command.

*Ongoing Operations*

[DELETED]

Currently, we have operations ongoing with a little over 30,000 people involved in those operations. This is not to say these are the only people deployed from the United States. But these are the only people deployed on what we would call an operational deployment. There is training going on and other things of that kind. So many, many more people than this are actually deployed at overseas locations. But these are the ones involved in specific operations, and they are shown on this particular slide.

## European Command

- Intelligence Update
- Ongoing Operations
  - *Provide Promise - FRY*
  - *Sharp Guard - Adriatic Interdiction*
  - *Deny Flight - Bosnia*
  - *Able Sentry - Macedonia*
  - *Provide Comfort - Turkey / Iraq*



I think we will start with the European Command. We have five major operations going on there. We have had them going on for some time. The first four, of course, are focused on the Balkans and the last on Iraq. And, we will follow the format for this, as we go into each command, I will turn to Admiral Wilson and have him give you sort of an intelligence perspective to set the framework for why we are there. Then I will talk to the operational parts of it.

So I will turn to Admiral Wilson, now, for intelligence highlights in Europe.

### *Intelligence Update*

#### *Rwanda/Burundi: Ethnic Tensions Continue*

[DELETED]

Admiral WILSON. I will talk about our two hot spots in Europe, one of which is really not in Europe but in the European Command. Of course, that's Central Africa where, in Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic tensions continue to threaten the region.

The primary threat, of course, is massive—

Senator McCAIN. What's the population of those countries?

Admiral WILSON. They are about 6 million to 7 million. They are almost mirror images of each other.

Senator McCAIN. Out of a population of 6 million to 7 million in Rwanda, about 2 million are refugees?

Admiral WILSON. That's correct. Yes, sir.

The ethnics, broken down, show about 85 percent are Hutu and about 15 percent are Tutsi. The Tutsi control the government and the military in both countries. There are some Tutsi refugees as well. But most of them, especially Rwandan, are Hutu. About 500,000 or so are internally displaced, the remainder distributed to Kenya, Zaire, and Tanzania.

[Deleted.]

Senator MCCAIN. Who is our Ambassador in Burundi?

Admiral WILSON. I forget his name, sir. He has been the object of

Senator MCCAIN. Was he the one that was the candidate for the Senate in Texas?

Admiral WILSON. That's correct.

Senator MCCAIN. Krueger.

Admiral WILSON. That sounds right. He has been specifically threatened a couple of times in the Tutsi dominated press in Burundi.

Most recently, this weekend, when he was singled out that he should be "punished" for what they view as a tilt or an inclination to be favorable toward the Hutu as opposed to the Tutsi, this same perception exists with the relief organizations as well.

Senator MCCAIN. Have there been any threats to our Ambassador in Rwanda?

Admiral WILSON. No, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. Maybe we ought to have the Ambassador come home for consultation, from Burundi.

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

Senator MCCAIN. Total?

Admiral WILSON. Total. Yes, sir.

The other thing I wanted to mention is the ex-Rwandan soldiers who populate some of these Hutu refugee camps in Kenya and Zaire form the basis for a resistance movement. They can recruit Hutus and make forays into Rwanda. That is why both in Rwanda and Burundi the countries view them as threats.

Senator MCCAIN. Do we have evidence of what has happened to refugees who left, to Hutus who left the refugee camps, what happened to them?


Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

When the people left the camps and went to other locations, they were subjected to some beating and harassment by Tutsi townspeople and soldiers. However, after they left the camp area, they were not killed or massacred, or anything like that.

A lot of the killing, by the way, in that camp was conducted by Hutus in their trying to get their fellow Hutus to leave, maybe as much as 50 percent. I think that about covers Central Africa.

## Intelligence Update

## Former Yugoslavia: Fighting Likely To Increase



I would like now to turn to the former Yugoslavia, with your permission, sir, and just walk around that region.

With the breakdown officially of the ceasefire on April 30, fighting is likely to continue to increase, both in Bosnia and, as we have recently seen, in Croatia as well. The most recent high visibility action, of course, was the Croatian move into the sector west, which is midway between Zagreb, as shown in gray there, and the Serbian border.

[Deleted.]

Right now, the situation is calm. [Deleted.] But it is tense in all the border areas between the gray and the pink that you see on this chart, where the zone of separation is between the Krajina Serbs and the Croatians.

Moving counterclockwise there, we continue to look at the Bihać enclave as the area of Bosnia which has the most humanitarian difficulty. Only about 15 percent of the targeted aid scheduled for that region got in in the month of April, the same as in May.

[Deleted.] And, of course, we have about 8,000 U.N. personnel which are scheduled to stay in there under the new agreement.

As you well know, Sarajevo has been under increasing attacks by Bosnian Serb artillery in the last couple of weeks. A mortar attack this weekend killed about 10 at the entrance of one of the tunnels under the airport which supports the city. The Bosnian Government, of course, is seeking greater international action in response to what they view as the Serbian attacks.

I would point out, however, that the fighting which started again this spring in most areas of Bosnia was initiated by the Bosnian Government in the area of Tuzla, in Central Bosnia, and elsewhere, with infantry attacks against Bosnian Serb positions.

Senator McCAIN. How close are the Europeans to a decision to get out?

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

Finally, sir, from all indications, Macedonia, where we have a battalion of U.S. forces, or U.N., is stable, with no immediate threat of a spillover in the region of the war into Macedonia.


The final point I would like to make is that the airport in Sarajevo has been closed to humanitarian relief flights now for over a month, about 31 days, the longest closure of the airport since this all started in 1992.

UNPROFOR military flights are still going in, but no UNHCR flights. There are, however, ground relief convoys that make it through regularly, and all of the eastern enclave convoys are going on at a level sufficient to prevent a humanitarian crisis.

General ESTES. Senator McCain, before I go on and discuss the operational aspects related to the Balkans, I might just go back to your question.

It's obvious that, in terms of the rhetoric we hear out of the French and the British, they are talking about withdrawing their forces. [Deleted.]

### *Provide Promise/Deny Flight/ Sharp Guard/Able Sentry*



On this next slide, you see the areas, the four operations in which we have things going on in relation to the Balkans. These are four areas we have talked to this committee about before. I will very quickly review them and then get on to some other specific comments related to things happening in the Balkans related to U.S. forces.

Provide Promise, of course, is the first one. It really involves the U.S. resupply flights that we were talking about earlier, the UNHCR missions, carrying goods into places like Sarajevo. We

have not done any air drop missions in almost a year now. They have not been required because the convoys are getting through, although we have been using our C-130s to carry UNHCR foodstuffs and things of that kind into Sarajevo.

But, as the Admiral mentioned, we have not done any of that since early April.

The larger part of what is going on with the Provide Promise force right now is the UNPROFOR hospital. It's actually a U.S. hospital supporting the UNPROFOR forces in Zagreb. The majority of the people we have in Provide Promise now are associated with that hospital.

It's about 300 of the 500 you see listed on the slide.

Deny Flight, of course, the primary purpose of that, the second operation, is to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina and to provide air support for UNPROFOR. We have not had great success in recent times with the air support for UNPROFOR and it gets requested. NATO approves it and, because it requires U.N. approval as well, we are not getting U.N. approval for those strike missions. In fact, we had one 2 days ago that was denied.

We are doing air presence missions, however. They are being requested, and we are flying them as per UNPROFOR's request.

Sharp Guard is the enforcement of the U.N. embargo against the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Of course, we are participating in that. [Deleted.] We have not had any trouble with that particular change to the use of U.S. force in carrying out this overall embargo against the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Operation Able Sentry, of course, is designed to maintain a U.S. presence along the Macedonian border. We are there to monitor and report activities which undermine the stability or threaten the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, and really is there as a firebreak to make sure the war does not spread down there and that we have both—we have UNPROFOR forces there.

The United States is not the only country with forces involved in that. Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark also have forces. So the total, as you can see from the slide, is about 1,000 UNPROFOR forces there to monitor that situation so that we have adequate warning of the problem of any spread of the conflict down into the area of Macedonia.

Those are the four operations we have been involved in now, most of them for over 2 years, and they are still ongoing.

In terms of U.S. military in Bosnia-Herzegovina now, there are 16 U.S. military. Most of them are liaison officers and a very small number on the UNPROFOR staff. They are supporting General Ruppert Smith, the UNPROFOR commander for forces in Bosnia.

I mentioned to you the number of people in Zagreb. That has been of particular concern to us during the past week since we have had some rocket attacks against Zagreb. We are very concerned about the protection of our forces there.

We have obviously had some recent—not recent—but some examples of people thinking people are well protected and, in fact, due to a missile attack or a rocket attack, we find large numbers of U.S. losses. We want to prevent that from happening in Zagreb.

We have not had any direct attacks on the airfield itself, where our forces are located. But stranger things could happen. So we

have taken all the measures we could possibly take to protect the forces that we have there to be sure they have the kind of overhead protection they need.


There are some additional upgrades going on now in terms of doing more bunkering of the facilities. We have all of the people in the areas they sleep in now, we had them in tents for a while, but, because of this threat, we now have them in a place where they have overhead cover and a secure place where they can sleep.

We will finish all of the sandbagging of all the facilities we have around the airport dealing with Provide Comfort, in particular the hospital. It will all be sandbagged by today. We will move all of the people who have been in tents out of the tents.

Obviously, it is an interim measure, as I mentioned. We are making them move for sleeping purposes. We want their permanent living quarters to be out of those tents so they have adequate protection, as good as we can get it.

Now this is going to be an increasing thing over time. We will continue to make more improvements to ensure the adequate protection of our forces that are there in Zagreb.

### *Operation Provide Comfort*



The next slide talks to Operation Provide Comfort, which, of course, is designed to deter aggression against the peoples of Northern Iraq and also to enforce the no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq.

I might add that, with the exception of the incident we had about a year ago at this time, the unfortunate accident involving the Black Hawks and the F-15s, that has been a relatively incident free area for our operation. Obviously, there have been operations involving Turkish forces in there. But in terms of our operations for Provide Comfort, it has been a relatively good operation.

We have not had any incursions above the no-fly zone from Iraqi aircraft in over a year now.


[Deleted.]

That will complete our look at the European command.

## Central Command



- Intelligence Update
- Ongoing Operations
  - *Southern Watch*
  - *Arabian Gulf MIO*
  - *Sinai Multi-National Force / Observers*



We will turn now to the Central Command, and I will turn it back to Admiral Wilson to discuss the intelligence aspects of this region.

### *Intelligence Update*

#### *Iraq: Pressure Mounting on Saddam*



[DELETED]

Admiral WILSON. We will discuss both Iraq and Iran during this portion of the briefing. Pressure is mounting on Saddam Hussein economically, politically, and pressure in the north and south by insurgent movements.

[Deleted.]

Now the regime has been weakened and shaken by the sanctions. But it is not yet broken and is reacting by improving its internal security.

There have been at least two coup attempts, known coup attempts, since January, the one in January led by Air Force officers, which we didn't really find out about until later, which was a completely unsuccessful attempt. Then, of course, there was the March coup attempt in which Kurdish factions attacked Iraqi Army units in the north. This was under the leadership of a former Iraqi military intelligence officer.

[Deleted.]

As a result of all of this, Saddam is increasingly circling himself with trusted family members and currently has put his son in

charge of security and many of the Republican Guard forces that provide security for the regime.

[Deleted.]

Of course, they would like to prompt a mass defection of the Iraqi Army. That is what they would need to have success against the government.

If they do get sustained success or more than Saddam could tolerate, then he would be likely to have a harsh retaliation against the Kurds by using Republic Guard armored forces, moving them out of garrison and going north to the areas where he was being beaten. But we do not see that on the horizon right now.

In the south, the Shia rebels, which are backed by Iran but not with direct Iranian fighting in the country, are trying to reverse the Iraqi success in draining the marshes, by blowing up dams, targeting levies, and targeting Iraqi engineers that are trying to dam up the area. This is because if they flood them, then the Shias get a relative advantage in mobility.

Saddam has been able, for the most part, to counter the Shia operations in the south with regular Army forces and infantry forces, and, therefore, the Republican Guards which would be the regime's protection, have remained north of the 32 degree north parallel. We continue to see them engaged in routine draining and routine operations.

Turning to Iran, of course this is a clearly emerging threat in the Persian Gulf region. Just tracking arms deliveries this year, we have seen the delivery of two Scud transporter erector launchers from North Korea. I might add those were done very covertly in Korea and were difficult to pick up.

[Deleted.]

Senator McCAIN. If I could ask you to pause for a minute, there is a vote on and we have about 5 minutes.

Please proceed with the briefing, and I will be back as soon as we can vote.

Admiral WILSON. Yes, sir.

[Deleted.]

*Intelligence Update  
Iran: Emerging Threat*



[DELETED]


Finally, as you know, we continue to track the foreign nuclear aid to the Government of Iran, provided both now and perhaps into the future, by China and Russia. China is largely working on the front end of the nuclear cycle, and Russia has a protocol signed across the breadth of the nuclear cycle.

[Deleted.]

# MFO Sinai / Operation Southern Watch/ Arabian Gulf MIO



MFO Sinai - July 83  
 Observe and report violations of the  
 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty  
 U.S. Forces - 984 Allied Forces - 1,003



[DELETED]

[DELETED]

General ESTES. These are the three operations we have ongoing in the CENTCOM area. I will start with the Multinational Force and observers in the Sinai. As you all know, that has been going on now since 1979. It is there to observe and report on any treaty violations between the Israelis and the Egyptians.

About 2,000 total people are involved, of which nearly 1,000 of them are United States. We have two battalions and a company in there, one infantry battalion, a logistics battalion, and an aviation company. This operation obviously has been going on for about 12 years, and the funding for this is provided by the governments of Egypt, Israel, Germany, Japan, and, this year, starting this year, Switzerland.

In terms of Operation Southern Watch, this is for the south, below the 32nd parallel, similar to what the Provide Comfort flights are doing north of the 36th parallel in that they are enforcing the United Nations Security Council resolutions governing what the Iraqis are allowed to do in that part of the country. It enforces the no-fly zone.

Here is another area where we were flying a lot of sorties. [Deleted.]

That deals with the aircraft piece of it.

In terms of the Arabia Gulf maritime operation, what we call the Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO), obviously that is there to enforce the embargo against Iraq. It used to involve U.K., France, Australia, Canada, and ourselves. We are the only ones involved in the operation at the moment.

[Deleted] and they are fairly effective at doing what they are designed to do, which is to prevent goods going into Iraq or coming out from, that are embargoed by the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Senator Nunn, we are in the process of going through region by region. We have just finished the Central Command area and are

turning now to the Atlantic Command. As we have done with each of the regions, we have gone through Europe and now through Central Command. I am going to turn now to my compatriot here, Admiral Wilson, who will give the intelligence update for the Atlantic Command.

Senator NUNN. Okay. I am going to try to catch up with you as we go through here.

Admiral WILSON. Good morning, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Good morning, Admiral.

## Intelligence Update

### Haiti: Slow Progress; No Major Setbacks



#### Security Issues


- "Secure and Stable" environment continues
- Threat to US/UNMIH Forces currently low
- Some Vigilance Brigades cooperating with IPSF

#### Political: President Aristide testing support for term extension

- Some reports of surveillance/action groups
- Right-wing marginalized; quiet
- Left-wing becoming fractionalized

#### Elections

- On schedule for 25 June
- No sign of widespread fraud, low-level violence expected



Admiral WILSON. Looking first at Haiti, since the transition to the U.N. forces in Haiti at the end of March, we judge that the environment, basically, remains secure and stable from the security point of view.

Violence that we see generally has been characterized as criminal, rather than political, although there have been a few isolated exceptions. April crime statistics were lower than March and the first police academy graduates are supposed to come out on the first of June.

Some of these Vigilance Brigades, which were formed up earlier this year, gave us some concern but are now showing evidence of cooperating with the interim public security forces. We have examples of where criminals have actually been turned over to them unharmed, as opposed to being beaten up or killed by the Vigilance Brigades.

The threat to the U.N. forces is currently low. We have had a couple of instances where gang activity began to rise. But increased patrols in the areas seem to have suppressed it.

[Deleted.]

Right now, elections are still scheduled for June 25. They seem to be on schedule. Voter registration is proceeding. The political

candidates are signed up. There is no evidence of any widespread fraud, although, as you well know, in the past, Haitian elections have been characterized by violence, and some low level violence is expected in this one as well, which, hopefully, should be suppressed by the presence of the UNMIH forces.

Senator NUNN. On the assassination that did occur there, if it was an assassination, you mentioned some evidence. What is the evidence? What's the best evidence you have now about whether the government was involved and, if so, whether President Aristide himself was involved?

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]


Senator NUNN. That who may have been involved?

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

General ESTES. Senator, we will turn now to look at the operation down there.

Of course, as you know, on the first of April, we transitioned from a coalition operation, led by the United States, to a United Nations operation.

### UNMIH Employment Concept



What you see on this slide is the overall employment concept. This differs significantly from the way we did it, from the standpoint that we had large troop concentrations, a brigade each, one at Port-au-Prince and one at Camp Haitian in the north.

You can see that under the U.N. concept, they are spreading the forces out, across the countryside, a lot more than the United States did in terms of infantry. We used a large number of SOF forces, Special Operations Forces, to control the countryside. Some SOF forces remain as part of the UNMIH force. But because the numbers have been decreased and because of the importance the U.N. places in maintaining a safe and secure environment in the

countryside as well as Port-au-Prince, they have elected to disperse a lot of their force out over various regions, as you see shown here.

There are six different regions.


The two initial main operating locations were the same as our two—one at Port-au-Prince and one at Cap Haitien in the north.

They are going to move out to five battalion sized hubs, which are shown here by the stars. That will be completed by the end of this month.

Then they will go out into additional company-sized hubs, which is shown by the red dots on the slide. They will be out in those locations hopefully by mid-summer.

So it is a little different concept of employment for this UNMIH force, as opposed to the coalition force led by the United States that was there.

### UNMIH Command Structure




The next slide shows the command structure. As you are aware, Maj. Gen. Joe Kinser is the commander of the UNMIH force. He is also the U.S. commander there as well.

The U.S. contingent, of course, is about 2,500. It is mainly supporting elements of headquarters engineering, aviation, medical, and, as I mentioned earlier, about 550 SOF folks are still there that are out doing what they have always done and done such a good job of in the countryside, with their teams.


# Professionalization of Police

## CIVPOL



### UNMIH CIVPOL: 900

|             |     |
|-------------|-----|
| Cap Haitien | 180 |
| Gonaives    | 118 |
| PAP (Rural) | 144 |
| Les Cayes   | 164 |
| PAP (Metro) | 318 |



The next slide talks about an important issue because we want to get out of the business of having to use the military to maintain a safe and secure environment, and transition to a police force that is able to do that.

There are civilian police there now that are helping current Haitian police, which are called IPSF, the Interim Public Security Force, to maintain the normal police duties that would take place throughout the country.

So you can see there are about 900 of these. Many of them were there when we were there. They were called interim police monitors. If you remember that term, the civilian police basically does the same thing.


They are out. They are experienced police from various countries who are used to accompany the interim public security force, monitor their activities, accompany them on patrols, evaluate their training and effectiveness, and to help them improve their overall capability to do the classical police functions of a democracy.

## Professionalization of Police

### Haitian National Police



| Class Start | # Attending | Graduation |
|-------------|-------------|------------|
| 6 Feb       | 373         | 1 Jun 95   |
| 13 Mar      | 376         | Jul 95     |
| 17 Apr      | 375         | Aug 95     |
| 15 May      | 375         | Sep 95     |



The next slide here shows the interim public security force of about 3,500. You can see how many locations they are in now.

Remember that we started with nothing here 6 months ago, 7 months ago. They are out at 25 different locations now, and these are the Haitians maintaining the normal police duties of their country.

All of these, the vast majority of these, I should say—not all, but the vast majority—are former FAD-H members who went through a very short training course of about 6 days that we gave them.

We changed uniforms. They wear a different kind of uniform, and they are currently doing the policing functions throughout the country.

The most important thing is that we have developed a plan for a permanent police force for Haiti, and it centers around the police academy that Admiral Wilson mentioned. We started classes, as you can see here, in early February. The first graduation will be in June, with about 375 every month after that. The plan is to train about 7,000 police.

That is a fairly substantial number. But it is felt by the Haitian Government that that is what they need in order adequately to maintain the normal functions of a police force in their country.

So this is going to take a little time. The plan is to have it all completed before the UNMIH force leaves. And this new, well-trained Haitian police force is providing the functions of a normal police force for a democratic country.

Senator NUNN. General Estes, how about the judicial system. When I was there 6 weeks ago, or whenever it was, it was apparent that the police trainees are going to know more about law than the judges when they get through. The judges are on a fee system. Many of them are illiterate and uneducated, and the police will

probably, in effect, be taking over everything if there is no semblance of a judicial system.

I know you have had some of your Reserve forces down there. There was talk about the American Bar and talk about getting French lawyers in there since it is a French system. Is anything really happening along that line because, when we were there, it was all planning. There wasn't any, really much activity.

General ESTES. The Justice Department, of course, is working this hard. We have, as you just described, had some military people down there helping, trying to stand the system up. But, ultimately, it is a Department of Justice issue and I am really not qualified to speak about where they are in the process.

I have seen the same plans that you have seen. I would say, from a military person's perspective, trying to maintain the safe and secure environment has been our job. The next two pieces that need to really be worked on are, one, the job program for Haiti—because if the economy does not come back, you cannot maintain safety and security with military people forever—and, second, the judicial system needs to be stood back up. If it is not, they have no way to handle these people. All these people that we train as police will have no way to respond to the situation that may be created there.

I know there has been a lot of discussions. There have been a lot of interagency meetings held on this issue. The actual timetable for improving the overall judicial system, I do not have it at hand here. The Justice Department could give you a further explanation of that.

Senator NUNN. Could we get staff to ask the Justice Department to furnish us this information? I was very impressed with the caliber and the quality of the young recruits they have in training.

Is that still successful?

General ESTES. I think it has been very successful. Are you talking about in the police academy itself?

Senator NUNN. The police, right. The police academy.

General ESTES. The quality has been maintained. The government itself is looking very carefully at anybody that they accept. They have passed fairly rigorous entrance requirements.

# Professionalization of Police


IPSF

## Current IPSF

3,544

Officers = 181

Enlisted = 3,363



We have noted, interestingly enough, that many of the people serving in the interim public security force, the 3,500 or so that are there now, the former FAD-H members, most of them are not able to pass the entrance exams for this police academy. So very small numbers of them are moving into the police academy.

So they have really gone out to the general population and taken a different cut of Haitian to put them into this and to train them from scratch.

So, as a result, I think they don't have any bad history to fall back on, as some of the FAD-H people may, even though the ones we've put into the IPSF—I say the ones we did, the ones the Haitians did—were screened very carefully. They were clearly the ones with the least amount of abusive events triggered against them. And the fact, I guess, that they found any that were, in fact, quantifiable, they were not accepted in the IPSF.

So the 3,500 they have in the IPSF right now are the best of the 7,000 or 8,000 FAD-H that were there to start with.

## Intelligence Update Cuba Continues to Adjust

[DELETED]

We will turn now to Cuba and I will turn it back to Admiral Wilson for a quick discussion of the intelligence aspects of this issue.

Admiral WILSON. Sir, Cuba continues to adjust from the withdrawal in the late 1980s of Russian aid.

On the political front, Castro appears to be confident of his control and, interestingly enough, they view this recent migration accord—this is the Cuban view—as the start of a normalization process. Ricardo Alarcon, who has long been a member of Castro's inner circle, of course was the chief of this migration accord negotiating team. He keeps saying that a fundamental change has taken place and, for the first time, the two governments were able to resolve difference on the basis of equality. Again, that is the Cuban view.

The Communist Party is clearly in charge, even though it is static or downsizing. Membership in the Communist Party no longer has the perks it once had because people are no longer guaranteed lifetime jobs and guaranteed educations.

Interestingly enough, reformers continue to dominate economic positions within the government. This occurred in late January of 1995, kind of a shakeup of the economic team. Even though the recession is at the lowest point, there is a view in Cuba, I think, that the worst is passed. A special readjustment period is coming to an end.

The recent NIE on Cuba assesses that the economy probably is at a low ebb and will experience minor improvements in the near-term. However, the demands of consumption and to reform the economic infrastructure are so severe that it will not result in a great change for the population.

You can see, however, that the farmers' markets provide some relief. Foreign investment continues, albeit at a slow pace, focusing primarily on tourism and mineral development.

The military, as you well know, have been downsized by 50 percent or more since 1989, and about 60 percent of the equipment is mothballed. Training is only 30 percent of the pre-1989 levels. And, as is similar in other Communist countries, the military is very involved in agricultural duties, farming, in order to feed themselves and take care of themselves, which is not, of course, the kind of job that they'd hoped to have when they signed up to the military.

Migration, there will still continue to be some illegal migration out of Cuba, but at greatly reduced rates because of the recent accord. What we are likely to see is more sophisticated smuggling operations as Cubans try to end-run the Coast Guard, and we'll increasingly see routes through the Bahamas and Mexico as a better way to get out of the country.

But at least the migration time bomb has been defused for right now. General Estes.

## GTMO Operations

Migrant Population: 20,527

Change from last week: -389

|                     | Last Wk | Last 30 Days | To Date |
|---------------------|---------|--------------|---------|
| Self Repat          | - 3     | 56           | 988     |
| Repatriated         | 0       | 51           | 554     |
| Paroled             | - 527   | 2,093        | 9,808   |
| Camp recount        | 13      |              |         |
| Interdicted (Cuba)  | 34      |              |         |
| Interdicted (Other) | 89      |              |         |
| Walk In             | 5       |              |         |
| Total               | - 389   |              |         |

U.S. Forces

Army: 3,713  
 Navy: 655  
 Air Force: 1,130  
 Marines: 313

General ESTES. This slide shows you that there are about 20,000 migrants at Guantanamo. Almost all of them are Cuban at this stage of the game.

If you recall, we had a number of Haitians here. But all but a very few have left, and those few Haitians that are left are people who have a medical problem or are children who we are trying to place back into orphanages back in Haiti.

So the bulk of this is Cuban.

I show you this slide only for one reason, and that is to show you how, on a weekly basis, we track numbers. I won't go into what they all mean. We do very detailed looks at these things to try to sort out exactly what the numbers are and how much they are decreasing each week or increasing, as we had the case sometimes in the past.

Clearly, the plans were moving ahead to provide for the long-term care of the rafters that were there. But with the recent agreement, the situation has obviously changed. As a result, we would expect that the migrants that are there now, this nearly 20,000, to be paroled or immigrated into the United States or return to Cuba in accordance with the agreement in the not too distant future. [Deleted] that the number of migrants that are there would be down to zero.

Clearly, this will release most of the nearly 6,000 U.S. military we have had there, maintaining security and caring for the Cubans in a humane way, in accordance with the way we would want to do that.

A number of the military people there have been doing things that, clearly, we don't feel are the sorts of things U.S. military should be doing. But this is something the nation asked us to do. They did an excellent job with the Cubans down there. There were extremely good relations between the rafters themselves and our

military, and I think the Cubans hold the military, the U.S. military, in a very high regard as a result of this contact we have had with the Cubans.

I have visited Gitmo myself a couple of times and found everything I had heard about it to be true in terms of the relations. The conditions were not the best. And so, improvements to the camps were underway. That will now come to a halt as we expect this operation down there to terminate in the not too distant future.

We will, however, maintain a camp in a sort of semipermanent status in case the situation comes up again, because it could be created again in the not too distant future if the policies happen to change. So we are not going to disassemble the whole camp. We're going to maintain a reasonable amount of capability so that, if something happens on the spur of the moment, we have a facility ready to accommodate whatever the future may hold.

### *Southern Command*



- Intelligence Update
- Ongoing Operations
  - *Safe Border*



We will turn now to the Southern Command and look at the one operation we have going on down there. But first, an intelligence update.

### *Intelligence Update*

#### *Peru/Ecuador Steady, But Weary Progress*



[DELETED]

Admiral WILSON. Sir, this slide got out of date as soon as we made it. This morning, there was a ceasefire incident yesterday, not actually in the zone of separation between Peru and Ecuador,

but just to the north of it, in which an Ecuadorian and a Peruvian patrol had a firefight. One Peruvian soldier was killed and one Ecuadorian was wounded.

However, they seem to be reacting calmly, and we do not see out of this incident a significant threat to the ongoing operations.

The separation of forces in Peru/Ecuador was completed by May 3. You can see the numbers there withdrawn, slightly under 2,000 for Peru and slightly under 3,000 for Ecuador. They each have about 50 soldiers left at an outpost each in the area—just outside the area, I should say.

Politically, Peru will not cede territory, even that which was occupied by Ecuador during the fighting, but could potentially grant Ecuador access to the Amazon, but no sovereign port on the rivers.

Ecuador, of course, wants the territory that they say they captured ceded to them and really desire sovereign access to the Amazon. So it will take continued negotiations to make this a real se-cure area.

Over the next 30 days, we think that the forces will remain separated, and we believe there will be a demobilization in the coastal border area where both sides have built up during the conflict.

They have put their forces out of garrison. Peru added one division and Quito added one brigade to what they had in the border area. They are still out of garrison. But we think, under the leadership of the MOMEPE, they will begin to withdraw soon.

Over the long-term, we don't see direct Peruvian-Ecuadorian negotiations without some type of facilitation by the guarantor nations. But they need to have those long-term discussions for a final solution. Otherwise, hostilities could resume in 6 to 12 months.

But right now, we think that the Peru-Ecuador situation is fairly stable.

# Total US Military Safe Border



General ESTES. Operation Safe Border is the title we have given to the U.S. involvement in this operation in terms of separation of forces between Ecuador and Peru. It has involved about 85 U.S. personnel.

Mr. Chairman, I am General Estes and this is Admiral Wilson. Chairman THURMOND [presiding]. I am glad that you are here.

General ESTES. What we have done this morning, Mr. Chairman, so far is we have gone through most of the regions. We have gone through the European area, the Central Command area. We have looked at the Atlantic Command, and we are now looking at the Southern Command in terms of an explanation of where we have U.S. military forces involved.

We are right now discussing the U.S. involvement in Ecuador and Peru and the separation of the forces down there as part of a guarantor observer group. We have 85 people involved in this operation, about 85—it says 84 on the slide—10 of which are actual observers. The remainder are support personnel, who are there to provide support for the guarantors. Most of them are at Patuca, as you can see from the slide. It is a forward support base. That is what FSB stands for, and that is where the forces are bedded down and where we fly the helicopter operation from that supports the overall separation forces that is shown down in that sort of reddish rectangular area, shown at about the center of the slide.

So far, the forces between Ecuador and Peru have separated in accordance with the agreement. There are very, very small numbers remaining on both sides that have not, but they are well within the limits established so far. About 80 Ecuadorians remain still in the forward area and about 40 Peruvians.

So for all intents and purposes, the forces have been separated in the confrontation area.

The mission has gone extremely well. I might add that the observers will continue to monitor the separation of forces pending a permanent diplomatic solution to the border dispute. We expect it to be moving into that phase in the very near future, and then, hopefully, in the not too distant future in the next 90 days or so we will see the withdrawal of these military forces as the Ecuadorians and Peruvians resolve their dispute in this particular part of the border.

With that, I think we will turn now to the Pacific Command and I will turn it back to Admiral Wilson.

Senator NUNN. Could I ask one question, Mr. Chairman, about that Ecuador-Peru business while we are here?

Chairman THURMOND. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Is this essentially about a piece of territory? What is this all about?

Admiral WILSON. It is really about a disputed area that wasn't completely cleared up in what they call the Rio Protocols. It is an area that is a very small chunk of territory that is disputed between Ecuador and Peru. It is very important to Ecuador because it has the headwaters to rivers, you know, for the Amazon, and it is also, of course, just a matter of the fact that over the period of 100 years, Ecuador has gradually lost land to Peru.

Senator NUNN. Is this a matter of pride or is it a matter of really crucial territory?

Admiral WILSON. Mostly a matter of pride, I think, macho pride.

General ESTES. I'm no historian on this, Senator. I'll sort of give you what my understanding of the situation is.

You can see on the slide there is about a 78 kilometer area that is in dispute between the two countries, and that revolves around the separation and the redivision of the countries following the Rio Pact at the end of World War II, or during World War II.

That part of the border was never settled. It has been in dispute for years and there have been flare-ups three or four times since the Second World War over this area.

As you can see, the disputed area that was fought in is that little tip of land that sticks up. What happened when the Rio Pact separated or redivided Ecuador and Peru is they gave a fairly sizable portion of Ecuador to Peru. That is what has created the feeling on the Ecuadorian part that they cannot afford to give up any more of their territory. In fact, the Peruvians were moving into what the Ecuadorians viewed as part of their country. That is what causes the dispute.

Eventually, something is going to have to be done to resolve this 78 kilometer area, or my opinion is we are still going to continue to have these flare-ups from time to time.

They make comments about it being important because of access to the River Congas. But anybody who has looked at that says giving you access to the river because of all the steep waterfalls on it does not give you an access to the Amazon, and it really is an issue of pride between the Peruvians and the Ecuadorians.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Admiral WILSON. I might add that, even though both sides mobilized in the coastal border area, Peru added a division to the four they had there and Ecuador a brigade to the three they had, there is a lot of evidence that neither side wanted this border area dispute to escalate into a war because neither side can afford it economically or politically.

Okay, on to Korea now.

### *Intelligence Update*

#### *Korea: LWR Compromise Remains Elusive*



[DELETED]

Of course, the big issue in Korea is the light water reactor talks, which are currently at an impasse. No agreement on the light water reactor type or the supplier. The issues for North Korea are face—i.e., they don't want to rely on the Republic of Korea to solve their energy needs; on security, they don't want Republic of Korea engineers, scientists, or technicians in North Korea; on strategy, they would like to continue to drive the ROK, South Korea, and the United States apart and link a permanent peace on the peninsula, in fact, to progress in the nuclear negotiation area.

[Deleted.]

As you know, meetings are being negotiated now between the State Department and Korea about the next round of meetings which could occur.

All this occurs within a backdrop of severe economic decline in North Korea. There are chronic food and energy shortages to feed their population and run their economy. The China trade is decreasing. The GNP in Korea since 1989 has declined about 18 to 25 percent.

The leadership, of course, is in transition. Kim Jong-il, Kim Il-Sung's son has not officially risen to some of his father's more exalted positions, although we do believe he is in charge, probably in a more collegial fashion, however, with a group of advisors, as opposed to the more dictatorial fashion and the single voice that Kim Il-Song had.

The military situation is such that they are at a very normal state for this time of year. You can see in the bottom right-hand corner of my graphic there U.S. Forces Korea tracks warning indicators. There are a total of 180, 39 of which are viewed as critical. We are at a very low state right now, with only one active. That is the leadership uncertainties—and three minor ones active.

This is much lower than we have seen in previous times, like Team Spirit or during the Desert Storm/Desert Shield timeframe.

The forces in Korea finished their winter training cycle. That is their peak readiness of the year. That ended in March, on March 31.

We did not see any inflammatory training. A lot of artillery training in the forward corps area, however not as much training

as we have seen in the past as far as the armored or mechanized forces being able to move.

Right now, we see the military heavily engaged in the spring agricultural support, not only to be able to grow food and to feed themselves and their own garrisons, but also diverting military manpower and resources to growing food for the population.

[Deleted.]

Let me see. The steps to start the reactor—General Estes reminded me of what needs to be done on that. We would have to, of course, reload the reactor with fuel, which we have not seen occur yet. Those are sealed. The reactor loading is sealed. [Deleted.]

In the next month or so we will have the ROK elections in June, and then, hopefully, some negotiations ongoing between Ambassador Gallucci and the North Korean representative.

But at this time, we do not see evidence of the nuclear freeze being broken, although they have threatened that and we think they would break the freeze if there is not progress in the negotiations.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Are there any questions? Senator?

Senator HUTCHISON. Yes. I would be happy to follow if there are questions from you, but I did have a question for them.

On the issue of the preparations to refuel the nuclear reactor, are you seeing activities to prepare for it that you have not seen before?

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

It is activity to prepare the reload, but in itself it is not a break of the nuclear freeze agreement nor is it particularly inflammatory.

[Deleted.]

The other thing is there is a reprocessing facility at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, and there is an area at the reactor where they store the spent nuclear fuel that they took out last year.

Movement of that spent nuclear fuel to their reprocessing facility for activation of the reprocessing facility would, of course, be a break in the freeze and, in many cases, even more inflammatory than starting the reactor. We have seen no evidence whatsoever of reprocessing or any intent to move the fuel, the spent nuclear fuel, from the cooling ponds that they are in.

There is a problem the Koreans have, however, and that is that this nuclear fuel in the ponds is decaying at some rate. Eventually it breaks apart and decays and it is a radioactive mess. It is very difficult to handle.

I don't think they are there yet. Technically, they have to do something with that fuel or I guess be beyond a point where they can't do anything with it.

It is a long-winded answer, I guess, to your question but it is what we have seen thus far.

[Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. IAEA was not allowed to make the detailed inspections. Why aren't they able to do that?

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

So I feel confident that we have a fairly good view of what's happening at the Yongbyon facility.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. We have been briefed that the North Korean artillery threat is formidable and that U.S. forces in Korea have deployed a counter battery radar system that gives our troops the ability to respond quickly and neutralize North Korean artillery fire.

However, our South Korean allies, who make up the bulk of the defense against possible North Koreans aggression, do not have such a system.

Would you evaluate the South's reasons for not deploying effective counter battery systems? Is it because of the cost or is it because the South does not view the North Korean artillery threat the same way we do?

General ESTES. Mr. Chairman, I am getting ready to go through two slides. If you would permit me, sir, I would like to do that and I will answer your question in the context of the slides because I am going to discuss that very issue.

Chairman THURMOND. That would be all right.

General ESTES. Is that permission? Good.

For the reasons Admiral Wilson just mentioned, there is obvious great interest in Korea. What I would like to do is to talk to you about some of the things that have happened since last summer's crisis, when the North Koreans downloaded the reactor at Yongbyon.

We took significant steps to improve the posture of our forces and to support them there. We did it and so did the Republic of Korea.

### *Programmed Modernizations U.S. Forces in Korea*



[DELETED]

I want to take just a couple of minutes to discuss some of those. We will start with the U.S improvements in force modernization first. I am not going to go through each of these in detail, but I just want to let you know that there are a lot of things that have happened to improve our forces there, such as [deleted].

Senator HUTCHISON. Did you add that to all 24 F-16s or did you bring in F-16s that had been refurbished?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. Totally?

General ESTES. Totally. Different aircraft. In terms of what the Republic of Korea is doing—and I will get to the Chairman's question as I discuss the one on this slide.

[Deleted.]

*Programmed Modernizations*  
*Republic of Korea Forces*



[DELETED]

Now I want to get to the Chairman's question, which is the counter-fire piece. [Deleted.]

They do not view the threat any differently than we do. The South Koreans do not. They recognize that it is a significant threat.

I think the difference comes in whether they think they will ever have to use it.

[Deleted.]

Very important—you have had General Luck in front of this committee testifying on this issue. I am sure he has spoken at length about it. It clearly is one of his major concerns as a theater commander in case of a conflict with the North Koreans.

[Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. Oh, really.

General ESTES. I would like to turn now, if I could, to some enhancements that have also been done.

*Enhancement Priorities*



[DELETED]

*Enhancement Priorities*



[DELETED]

Those are force modernization efforts for the United States and Iraq, and I want to apprise the committee of some enhancements that have occurred in the past year.

I am not going to go through all of the details on this slide but, rather, will say that there are six areas, three shown on this slide. One is to improve our indications and warning, centered on improving the sensors and the downlinks of the information from those sensors, and to provide additional staff support. The second one is to improve command and control, which is to improve the overall capacity for communications into the theater and also have done

some improvements in the kinds of equipment that are available there for command and control.

The third one is to protect the in-place forces which, obviously, is extremely important. [Deleted.] As of actions taken last year, base security has been enhanced tremendously. There are lots of physical improvements made to the bases—barbed wire put up, new, fortified positions, so that we can provide adequate base security for all of our bases in posts in South Korea.


[Deleted.]

Clearly, the bottom bullet that you see there on the very bottom of the slide talks to identifying forces, additional forces, that may have had to deploy. We have done lots of work on that to ensure we understand what needs to go and in what order General Luck wants it so that if he asks for it, we are ready to go.

What I will do now on the next slide is talk to you about things that have been done in relation to the current situation, which is the light water reactor crisis.

In preparation for the North Koreans doing something which may necessitate the military protecting itself from some type of military response, there have been actions taken by the chairman and Secretary of Defense to improve the overall situation for our forces there.

*US Forces Korea  
Readiness: Recent Actions*




### Non-Provocative Actions

- 152 Staff Augmentees deployed
- Carrier Battle Group on 5 day tether
- Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) on a 9 day tether
- Readiness of in-place units reviewed
- Forces which may be required to deploy identified

Ordered 12 April 1995

[Deleted.]

*Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration  
Exercise (R,S,O & I) 17 Apr- 19 May*



[DELETED]

*US Forces Korea  
Staff Augmentation*



Staff Augmentees to support  
CINCUNC/CFC, USFK and Component Staffs

|                  |                  |
|------------------|------------------|
| <b>Army</b>      | <b>420</b>       |
| <b>Navy</b>      | <b>178</b>       |
| <b>Marine</b>    | <b>55</b>        |
| <b>Air Force</b> | <b>62</b>        |
| <b>Joint</b>     | <b><u>35</u></b> |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>750</b>       |

The last piece I want to discuss in terms of Korea has to do with an additional staff augmentation ordered by the Secretary of Defense about a week ago. In fact, it was a week ago last weekend. It deployed an additional 750 staff augmentees in the services, from the services as you see here. They were designed to augment General Luck's immediate staff.

This is a problem for General Luck because in peacetime, the one staff he has serves as three staffs. It serves as the United Nations staff, the combined forces staff for the U.S. and the ROK forces, and also his USFK staff, which is his U.S. hat.

So he doesn't have people for three staffs. They all wear three hats.

This is an attempt to provide him enough augmentees that he can break his staff out to do the functions they should do and to give them 24-hour capability.

Some of these staff augmentees not only went to General Luck's staff but also to the components' staff, located for the four service components that are there.

So this is the additional piece that has happened as well. Those people are on their way to Korea now and will be in place within the next week or so.

# Exercise Team Spirit/JTF Full Accounting


## Task Force Full Accounting

Vietnam, Laos  
131 U.S. personnel, 14 Recovery Sites

### Team Spirit

KOREA

Exercise Canceled for 1995



I would like to turn now from Korea, although I will mention one other thing on Korea, and, of course, that is you are all aware that Team Spirit was canceled this year based on a decision between the Republic of Korea and the United States at the political level in an attempt to keep things moving in terms of the nuclear freeze and the Framework Agreement that was set on the nuclear issue.

There is no plan to restart that exercise at the moment, although if tensions continue to increase, it is always a possibility that the United States and Republic of Korea will decide to reinstate this exercise at some future date in 1995.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a couple of questions before we leave Korea or would you prefer to come back? I can do it either way.

Chairman THURMOND. That will be all right.

Incidentally, Senator Hutchison, I have a conflict. Could you please take charge of the committee?

Senator HUTCHISON. Surely.

Chairman THURMOND. We have a few questions we would like to provide for the record.

General Estes, Admiral Wilson, we want to thank you for your appearance here and for your testimony. I have an engagement that I have to attend.

Senator Nunn, you may proceed.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Chairman, I would like to just ask a couple of questions.

Senator HUTCHISON [presiding]. Certainly.

Senator NUNN. On Team Spirit, it is my understanding and correct me if I'm wrong—that this exercise was one that our own military did not feel was necessary and, basically, did not really want

to spend the money and have, but that we kept it out there more as leverage, as something we could drop when we wanted to.

Am I correct in that or not?

General ESTES. Senator Nunn, you are correct, and I hope I can accurately speak for General Luck here and try to put it in the way he has.

We have recognized for the last 3 years, 2 of which I was in Korea, that that exercise is really a political exercise. It is always going to be held hostage.

And so, General Luck's intent was to take the military utilities that were part of that exercise and to put them into other exercises that weren't quite as large. That is one of the reasons.

The RSO&I exercise that I just described was created a year ago to take the part of how we would work the support of augmentation forces out of Team Spirit and to conduct a separate exercise.

Similar things have been done in terms of the overall military utility for Team Spirit. So General Luck would say it would be nice to hold, but we have taken all of the military aspects of Team Spirit and moved them to other exercises because we know that negotiations are always going to do away with Team Spirit, or at least that has been the history of it for the past 2 years.

Senator NUNN. Would it be fair to say, then, General, that our military effectiveness and capability is not being diminished because of the cancellation of Team Spirit?

General ESTES. I think that would be General Luck's assessment. It is always nice to do one large exercise, where all of it comes together. But I think the approach General Luck has taken in terms of breaking the exercise up—we still get tremendous utility out of those exercises, and it is equal to, in General Luck's opinion, what we would get if we did Team Spirit.

Senator NUNN. The second question is this. You mentioned an intelligence update. This is for Admiral Wilson or General Estes, whoever can answer it.

The June elections represent a possible turning point in the ROK. Could you tell us what you mean by that?

What is shaping up in these June elections?

Admiral WILSON. For example, sir, with the elections pending and the domestic pressures of the elections, there may be more constraints on the South Korean Government with regard to whether or not they would be willing to make some type of concession on the light water reactor and things like that.

[Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. What are the possible outcomes of the elections? I know you are not into polling and that kind of thing. Are you doing any polling on that?

Admiral WILSON. Sir, I don't really have a good feel for what the outcome of the elections is going to be. I just believe that the campaign and the electoral process make it a different situation, you know, during the light water reactor negotiations than it could be after it is completed.

Senator NUNN. That term, general elections and possible turning point, to me that is a pretty strong message, and I am not sure what you're verbalizing equals what I see in the bullet here.

Admiral WILSON. That may be. I grant that that may be true. Maybe the bullet is not quite accurate, or maybe it is too strong.

Senator NUNN. I mean, elections always represent possible, or some change. But are you really saying the government position is going to get stronger or that the government position is going to get weaker?

Admiral WILSON. I think it is possible that the government could have a different position—you know, the ability to make some more, “concessions” may not be the right word, but to negotiate from a slightly different stance following the elections.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean stronger, a stronger position, or are you thinking it is going to get weaker?

Admiral WILSON. I think it might be a more liberal, a little more liberal position. I'm not sure “weaker” or “stronger” is the right characterization.

Senator NUNN. Well, in Korea, South Korea, if you are going to make concessions, you've got to be strong. So if you are going to make concessions, you are going to have to be a lot stronger than the government feels right now.

I assume that is what you are saying.

Admiral WILSON. I don't know that the government feels real strong right now. For example, one of the things that concerns us—you know, we look at the possibility of tensions continuing to increase, the possibility of, you know, military tensions. And I have been in discussions with analysts that talk, for example, about the Taegu gas explosion and the impact that has on the people, and that the people in South Korea are unsettled by things like that, unsettled with the government's reaction to it, the ability to respond to it, making them more susceptible to North Korean propaganda or North Korean sabotage, if that were to happen, and things like that.

So it is a difficult time, I think, for the South Koreans as these negotiations proceed.

Senator NUNN. General Estes, I was briefed—and I don't know where we are in terms of classification on this but I assume it is all right in this hearing, and if not, tell me—but back in the early part of this year or late last year, the North Koreans pulled artillery tubes out of the caves. They just had them sitting there and, of course, we used all that time period to pinpoint them, know where they are, so that we are in much better shape now in terms of targeting those cave-based artillery tubes than we were in the past.

Is that right?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

I'll let Admiral Wilson discuss that point from an intelligence aspect and then, if I have anything from an operational standpoint, I will come back to you.

Senator NUNN. If you have already covered it, I won't ask you to repeat, but I don't think I heard about it.

Admiral WILSON. We didn't really cover the artillery. [Deleted.]

Again, they are not pointed necessarily toward the South. In many cases, the guns are canvas covered.

We would be more concerned if we saw trackage in the imagery away from the sites that they are dispersed and into combat firing positions than simply being pulled out of the caves.

But we are watching it very closely on a daily basis as one of the indicators that we track for North Korea, sir.

Senator NUNN. General Estes, from an operational point of view, what do you think our capability is now to basically shut down those artillery tubes, or let's say shut down most of them as they, I am sure, during the first few days, would cause tremendous destruction in Seoul?

How quickly can we shut that operation down if we did get into a conflict?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. We use our active systems and their firepower, is that it?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. Now I looked hard, and where we are covering their artillery with our radar and our counterbattery fire power, how long would it take us to shut that operation down in that corridor? And then, how long would it generally—I'm talking ranges; I know you can't be precise. I'm just trying to get some estimate. How long would it be in the other areas?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. Will the ones that are left still be able to hit Seoul?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. Well, considering the fact that South Korea has not updated to the extent we think necessary and considering the fact that there will still be other firing systems that we will not be able to take out, it is still going to be a matter of weeks before we could shut down the rain of artillery fire on Seoul? Or is it going to be a matter of days?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. We have significantly improved our capability in the last 2 years, haven't we?

General ESTES. Significantly.

[Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. Are we still going to have hundreds of thousands of casualties on the South's side, counting both the United States and South Koreans, or are we talking about diminished casualties now?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

I have not heard him adjust that, because he was making those estimates with what I just described to you already in place.

Senator NUNN. What about bomber forces? Are we going to be hitting those caves with bombers, too? I mean, you're going to hit them with everything you've got, I assume, if we have a war, right?

General ESTES. We looked at that, and, in fact, we did a very in-depth study, trying to understand the geology of the area to determine if we dropped bombs on top of these caves, is the structure of the rock such that it would cause the caves to collapse.

What we have determined—we had some geologists study this while I was over there because it was, in fact, one of the ways I'd planned to use the B-52s.

[Deleted.]

Now that is not to say that if we get a serious problem somewhere that we don't put a lot of things against it. We could certainly, with air power, close a cave down. You can put enough things out in front of a cave, or 2, or 5, or 10, if they are causing you a particular problem. But to get all of the sites that the North Koreans have that they could put artillery in, they number in the thousands. And we would take all of the effort and put it against that one thing. In the meantime, these large numbers of forces would continue to come down on to the DMZ area if we didn't pay attention to that as well.

So General Luck has decided to do a lot of force protection measures on the south side of the line for the protection of the combined forces, United States and ROK, to be able to withstand an artillery attack, focus the artillery assets that he has against that threat in the best possible way that he can, and then try to put continuing pressure on the Republic of Korea to procure the necessary systems to provide for their own defense in this area.

Senator NUNN. Madam Chairman, thank you. I am sorry to take up so much time. But I wanted to get to this.

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, Senator Nunn, I hope you will just be informal and jump in any time. Let me just ask one minor question. Is the fact that they have their artillery in caves published?

General ESTES. Is it unclassified?

Senator HUTCHISON. Yes.

General ESTES. Yes. I'm sure it's well documented and it's a commonly known fact.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you.

Admiral WILSON. It is not all the artillery, either, that's in caves. There is some artillery and multiple rocket launch systems in caves. Others are kept in buildings, in storage sheds, and, of course, the problem with a lot of it in a wartime scenario is that it could be on the move. A lot of it could be on the move as well, which presents challenges for reconnaissance and targeting of resources.

Senator HUTCHISON. We were told at one point that they were brought out because they were perhaps rusting in the caves. Do we know if their equipment is in good shape and has it been refurbished and repaired? Or is it in bad shape?

Admiral WILSON. I think it is in good shape, especially as they have concentrated very heavily on artillery training during the winter training cycle.

[Deleted.]

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. You may proceed.

General ESTES. I just have one other, small area, a very important area, however, that I would be remiss if I did not mention. This is the involvement of our forces in what's called JTF, Joint Task Force Full Accounting, which, of course, is our attempt to recover the Americans lost in the Vietnam War.

This cooperative effort has recovered about 380 Americans previously unaccounted for. There are over 2,000 still remaining. The operations are underway in Vietnam and Laos and were recently completed, literally the first of this month, in Cambodia.

So we have, as you can see, over 100 U.S. military personnel now involved at 14 recovery sites. It is an area which we will continue to pursue as long as there are leads, until we have, as the name says, full accounting of all our missing.

Senator HUTCHISON. Are you are still getting credible leads?

General ESTES. Yes, still getting credible leads. There are a number of sites that have not been explored before that they have knowledge of, and these teams are working their way through the process. And as is evidenced by the fact that we are still recovering remains, it is an activity which we will continue to pursue as strongly as we can, as long as leads remain. I think, even if they do not, we will go out and try to continue to stir up new leads of locations of people that are not obvious to us now or remains of people so that we can bring this rather unpleasant thing to a close in a complete way for the families who still have loved ones missing.

Madam Chairman, that completes the briefing that we had prepared. I am prepared to talk to any other issue that you or Senator Nunn might bring up. We would be happy to discuss anything that has been here or anything else that you may care to bring up to us.

Senator HUTCHISON. Did you discuss Bosnia before I came?

Senator NUNN. I got here and tried to catch up by reading the briefing book on Bosnia since I have been here, but I was not here when they discussed it. They did go over it, I believe.

General ESTES. If you would like, we can go back to the slides and run through them again for you since neither one of you was here when we did it. But it's your choice.

Senator HUTCHISON. I'd like to.

Senator NUNN. I would like to see it, too.

Senator HUTCHISON. I have to be in my office at 11:30. But I would like to take that extra time. Let's just keep it informal.

I am interested in and would like to try to go to Macedonia in a couple of weeks. I would like to know what the status is and then see where I could go, where I could have access to the people who are over there.

General ESTES. Let me just try to talk to that a little bit. It is going to be a little hard to see on this slide.

Right now, we still have the four operations that you see up there ongoing from our perspective. This is both U.N. and NATO forces and U.S. forces, which are not a part of NATO that are participating in some of these operations.

Provide Promise is the top one. It is located primarily out of Zagreb, Croatia. We have about 500 people involved. Most of them are in Zagreb, although some who are doing this particular mission, which has to do with a humanitarian resupply, are located in other parts of Croatia.

There are not Provide Promise in any place other than Croatia—in other words, not in Bosnia, I should say.

[Deleted.]

As I mentioned, our big concern is the protection of our people there because of these rocket attacks. While the attacks have not been directed against the airfield at Pleso, which is where our forces are, the possibility is that could happen.

And so, we have gone back and relooked at all the security measures. I won't go over them in great detail, but would assure you that the Chairman himself has been involved, SACEUR has been involved, and the local theater commander, Admiral Snuffy Smith, has been involved. He personally went over and looked at these, the operation at Pleso, himself, last Saturday, and is confident that we are doing everything possible to provide adequate protection for our people.

We now have overhead cover for everybody, which we did not have. We had some people in tents. And so, that has been fixed. And we will continue to do upgrades, too, because you never know when this might happen again.

In terms of Bosnia, we have 16 U.S. people actually in Bosnia-Herzegovina now. They are there as liaison officers for the most part, a few on the UNPROFOR staff in United Nations positions. These are not U.S. people. They are doing U.S. jobs. They just happen to be wearing a U.S. uniform.

So there are very, very few people in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, and they are all in staff positions, as you would expect, in that the Congress has not approved our moving any forces other than that in there.

The only other place we have forces is located down in Macedonia. We have about 500 people, a battalion of forces there. It's about half of the forces that are in Macedonia for the U.N.

The purpose of those forces is to monitor the border to ensure that the war does not spread in that direction, to say it as simply as possible.

That, in fact, is what they are down there for. That's called Able Sentry, a sizable U.S. force down there.

Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark are also down in Macedonia. They have about an equal number to what we have, as you can see on the bottom of the slide, doing exactly the same missions, a U.N. mission.

Senator NUNN. General, on our deployment in Zagreb I communicated with the Chairman on this and talked to him this weekend about trying to beef up our protection. I'm glad to get the report that you've given on that. At least you are taking every step you can, I assume.

But how exposed are they to the Serb, the Croatian-Serb gunners? How much artillery and long-range fire capability is there within range of where we've got those, essentially medical-hospital type operations going on?

General ESTES. They are at risk from a large range of long-range artillery, I should say. Obviously, the rocket, the multiple rocket launcher systems are a problem. Frogs are a problem. SCUDs. I don't think they had any SCUDs.

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. And I understand now you've gotten, all of our troops have some kind of cover over and beyond tents, is that right?

General ESTES. That is correct. I said I wasn't going to go through this, but I know you have great interest in it. So let me just say, as of today, 100 percent of our personnel are out of tents.

The tents that are there are used for other reasons and have all been sand-bagged. That is going to be completed by today.

Senator NUNN. And the significance of getting them out of tents is at least that small munition anti-personnel stuff that starts coming in, shrapnel, they would not be as vulnerable to that.

General ESTES. They would not be as vulnerable. [Deleted.]

We've seen this before. We saw it happen in the Gulf war. So people who say the chances are low, okay, we acknowledge that. But unfortunately, it could happen and we just can't take the risk.

[Deleted.]

This is the problem that has been raised by many Members in this committee. The forces on the ground ask for support. The NATO forces agree to do it. We have never turned one down on the NATO side. And the U.N. force turns it down because their feeling is if we increase the tension by doing air strikes, it is going to cause a bigger problem for their people who are there on the ground because they will be held hostage or there will be retribution against the U.N. force.

So they need to stay very placid and not create any waves and allow the primary things they were designed to do in the first place, which is allow humanitarian aid to come in, to provide protection for the people who they are there to protect—primarily the Bosnian Government people, the Bosnians themselves. These things are going well. The thing that is not going well is the separation of forces and preventing the hostilities.

But the war has not spread beyond the current borders. The people are, in fact, being fed. There is no more genocide.

So three of the four objectives of this force are being accomplished. So, from the U.N. perspective, while it is frustrating to not permit an air strike when a force is asked for, their feeling is that the overall objectives of the U.N. forces are better met by not carrying out the air strike because it was causing retribution on U.N. forces, which is what they are trying to avoid.

I mean that, in a nutshell, is the issue.

Senator HUTCHISON. I cannot tell you how distressed that makes me. It is a situation in which the U.N. mission and the NATO mission are not the same, and we're trying to make peace in a country that has not agreed to peace. And the U.N. function is not appropriate at this point in time.

I am so concerned about that.

General ESTES. Senator, of course they would argue that they are, in fact, for the reasons I gave accomplishing what they were sent there to do. We have talked to them at length about this. The immediacy of not providing force protection for forces that have asked for it is extremely frustrating, especially to somebody in uniform. I don't pretend to justify the reaction of the U.N. force in denying the request. But I can understand from their political objectives what they are trying to do and their view is it is accomplishing the purpose.

They are afraid that if they have retribution against the United Nations forces and countries start losing people on the ground in larger numbers than they are already, that there may be an attempt by those major nations, such as the British and the French, to withdraw their forces.

Most of us feel very strongly that if the U.N. force withdraws, the consequences of their withdrawal are tremendous, and we are going to have a much, much worse situation than we do, albeit it is not a good situation now. But it will be much, much worse if they, in fact, withdraw. We won't be able to provide the humanitarian aid for all those people, we won't be able to prevent genocide, we possibly will not be able to prevent the spread of the war, and it is likely that if the Bosnians are successful against the Bosnian Serbs in an all-out exchange, that we might draw Serbia itself in on the side of the Bosnian Serbs, which would clearly expand the size of the war.

So those are the arguments that you hear for why UNPROFOR needs to stay.

It's not perfect. The feeling is they need to stay to allow—the fighting is going to go on between the two sides. It needs to come to some conclusion.

Every year the fighting has become less and the feeling is that it will eventually peter out and we are going to have to settle with some kind of agreement.

Now it is a muddling approach to a very, very tenuous and a very, very difficult situation. I am not going to say obviously where I stand on this. That is not of interest.

What is of interest is that there are people that do have views who are in positions—and I'm trying to convey to you what their thinking is in terms of the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, I think you have stated the different positions very well.

I am glad that we don't have U.S. forces as U.S. forces there because I do not think we should be involved in this fight. And, as a Member of Congress, I am never going to vote to put U.S. troops in there. I think the U.N. should be there when they have a peace agreement. And I do not want us to be drawn in.

On the other hand, I don't think that continuing to sit there and watch the fighting is perhaps something that we ought to condone.

Nevertheless, I think NATO has to be the lead on this, and I think NATO is not the lead. It is a very frustrating situation all the way around.

I thank you very much for being here. We appreciate it.

I hope you will forgive us for the in and out nature of this. We had our vote at 9:45 and there are several Members of this committee who are on the Budget Committee and are in a very important debate there, where the Chairman needed all of the Members. That is why many of our usual Members are not here.

Thank you very much. We appreciate all you are doing and we will be supportive of you in every way.

General ESTES. Thank you, Senator.

Admiral WILSON. Thank you.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

Senator THURMOND. General Estes, please review for me the circumstances and the sequence of events that must occur before NATO's Plan 40104 for the with-

drawal of UNPROFOR will be put into operation. In other words, what must happen on the ground in Bosnia and Croatia, at the U.N., and in the North Atlantic Council before the withdrawal plan is implemented?

General ESTES. [Deleted.]

ETHNIC SERB IMPEDIMENTS TO A U.N. WITHDRAWAL

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Wilson, please evaluate the prospects that the Serbs—whether the Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, or Serbia proper (i.e., the former Yugoslavia)—might NOT use force to impede the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Croatia. And a related question: if the Serbs do allow the U.N. to depart, what is the possibility of withdrawing U.N. troops in Bosnia's Eastern Enclaves through Serbia/Yugoslavia rather than by the most difficult route through Bosnia to the Adriatic coast?

Admiral WILSON. [Deleted.]

[Whereupon, at 11:31 am., the committee adjourned.]



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